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Securities Regulation
by L. Briley Brisendine, Jr.*

This Article surveys significant cases decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit during 1999 and 2000 in the
field of securities regulation. This Article also examines one rule
adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") during this
survey period that affects Eleventh Circuit precedent.
I.

SAFE HARBOR FOR FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

In Harris v. Ivax Corp.,' the Eleventh Circuit considered whether,
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),2
statements contained in the defendant corporation's press releases
qualified as "forward-looking statements."' The Eleventh Circuit also
addressed whether these statements were accompanied by sufficient
"cautionary statements" to come within the safe harbor provided by the
PSLRA.4 In Harrisinvestors sued defendant Ivax Corporation ("Ivax"),
its chairman and chief executive officer, and its chief financial officer,
alleging both fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
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1. 182 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 1999).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
3. 182 F.3d at 803-07.
4. Id. at 807.
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of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), 5 and Rule 10b-5' thereunder
and common law negligent misrepresentation. 7
On August 2, 1996, Ivax issued a press release announcing its
financial results for the second quarter of 1996. On September 30, 1996,
Ivax issued another press release in which it announced that it
anticipated a $43 million loss for the third quarter of 1996. On
November 11, 1996, Ivax announced a $179 million loss for the third
quarter of 1996, $104 million of which was a reduction in the carrying
value of the goodwill ascribed to certain of Ivax's businesses. Neither
the August 2 nor the September 30 press releases mentioned the
possibility of the goodwill write-down. Ivax had attached an italicized
warning to each of its two press releases informing investors of "what
kind of misfortunes could befall [Ivax] and what the effect could be." 9
The Ivax stock price fell upon the announcement of the write-down.'"
In the district court, plaintiff investors alleged liability based on two
theories. First, plaintiffs alleged that Ivax's economic projections were
fraudulent. Second, they alleged that Ivax's disclosure of factors that
could affect its projections were misleading because the disclosure
omitted the possibility of a goodwill write-down. Defendants moved to

5.

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
6. SEC Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).

7.
8.
9.
10.

182 F.3d at 802.
Id.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 802.
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dismiss based on the safe harbor provision" and heightened pleading
requirements 12 added to the Exchange Act by the PSLRA. The district
court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, and plaintiffs appealed. 3
On appeal, plaintiffs' theories of liability included that Ivax had
concealed its intent to write down goodwill by $104 million in the third
quarter of 1996 in its statements disclosing an optimistic outlook and
that the list of factors that could affect its projections omitted the risk
of the goodwill write-down."' The court first analyzed four excerpts
from Ivax's two press releases that contained the outlooks and list of
potential risks to determine whether each was a forward-looking
statement within the safe harbor.' The first statement was from the
August 2 press release and stated that "[rleorders are expected to
improve as customer inventories are depleted."" The court found that
the statement was a forward-looking statement because it was "'a

11.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c).

Section 102 of the PSLRA amended the Exchange Act by

adding Section 21E into the Exchange Act. The provision offers a safe harbor from civil
liability for both written and oral forward-looking statements that project, explain, or
estimate future events.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b). Section 101(b) of the PSLRA amended the Exchange Act to
require a complaint predicated on the fraud provisions of the Exchange Act to "specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading... [and the] reasons why the statement is
misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). Section 21D(b)(1) provides:
(1) Misleading statements and omissions
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and if an allegation regarding
the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.
Id. A complaint must also "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). Section
21D(b)(2) provides:
(2) Required state of mind.
In any private action arising under this title in which the plaintiff may recover
money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of
mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate
this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.
Id.
13. 182 F.3d at 802.
14. Id. at 804.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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statement of the assumptions underlying'... 'a statement of future
economic performance.'"" The same press release stated that "the
challenges unique to this period in our history are now behind us." 8
The court found that this statement, taken in context, was also a
forward-looking statement. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that
the statement could not be forward-looking because it was in the present
tense, the court stated that "a statement about the state of a company
whose truth or falsity is discernible only after it is made necessarily
refers only to future performance." 2' Finally, the press release quoted
Ivax's chairman and chief executive officer as saying, "'[Olur fundamental business and its underlying strategies remain intact ....

Only a

limited number of companies are positioned to meaningfully participate
in this rapidly growing market and, among them, Ivax is certainly very
well positioned.'" 2 ' As a "statement whose truth can only be known
after seeing how Ivax's future plays out," the court found this statement
to be forward-looking and within the safe harbor.22
The court next considered a list of factors, both factual and forwardlooking, contained in the September 30 press release that Ivax indicated
would influence its financial results for the third quarter of 1996.23
Plaintiffs alleged the list was misleading because it omitted the
expectation of a goodwill write-down.24 The court held that "when the
factors underlying a projection or economic forecast include both
assumptions and statements of known fact, and a plaintiff alleges that
a material factor is missing, the entire list of factors is treated as a
forward-looking statement."2' Therefore, the list of factors was a
"statement" within the safe harbor.2" The court reasoned that it is
appropriate to treat mixed lists as forward-looking for two reasons:
First, a list will only qualify as forward-looking if it contains assumptions underlying a forward-looking statement; 27 second, "a defendant
can fully benefit from the safe harbor's shelter only when it has disclosed
risk factors in a warning accompanying the forward-looking statement."28

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-5(i)(1)(D), (C)).
Id. at 805 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 806.
Id. at 807.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court next considered whether the cautionary language attached
to each press release was adequate, despite the fact that it did not
explicitly mention the factor that ultimately rendered the forwardlooking statements untrue, that is, the goodwill write-down.2" The
court held that the cautionary language satisfied Ivax's obligation to
mention "important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement[s]" and that the
PSLRA did not require a listing of all factors.30 Based on the foregoing,
the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint.3 1
II.

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF SEC FILINGS AND
STANDARD FOR SCIENTER PLEADING

In Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,32 the Eleventh Circuit considered
the proper scope of materials that a district court may consider in ruling
on a motion to dismiss in a securities fraud case. 3 The Eleventh
Circuit also addressed what standard a plaintiff must meet in order to
plead scienter adequately under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Exchange
Act.34 In Bryant shareholders sued defendant Apple South, Inc. ("Apple
South"), which is now known as Avado Brands, Inc., and several of its
officers in a securities class action lawsuit alleging that defendants made
false and misleading statements and material omissions in violation of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 35 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.3 6
Plaintiff shareholders also alleged that certain Apple South insiders had

29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i)). The conference report relating to the
PSLRA states that "[flailure to include the particular factor that ultimately causes the
forward-looking statement not to come true will not mean that the statement is not
protected by the safe harbor." H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 44 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 743.
31. 182 F.3d at 808.
32. 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
33. Id. at 1276-81.
34. Id. at 1282-87. Section 101(b) of the PSLRA amended the Exchange Act, in part,
by adding Section 21D(b)(2), under which a complaint predicated on the fraud provisions
of the Exchange Act must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). See
supra note 12.
35. See supra note 5.
36. See supra note 6.
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sold shares of Apple South stock in violation of Section 20(a)"7 of the
Exchange Act.38
Apple South owned and operated several chain restaurants. During
the class period defined by plaintiffs' complaint as May 26, 1995,
through September 24, 1996, Apple South pursued an expansion plan,
acquiring additional restaurants and expanding geographically. In May
1995, Apple South acquired eighteen restaurants located in the Midwest.
Plaintiffs alleged that Apple South's integration of these new restaurants, along with restaurants in a chain previously acquired into its
business model, was unprofitable and hurt Apple South's core business,
which consisted of its restaurants located in the Southeast. Plaintiffs
further alleged that Apple South's management knew the acquisitions
were creating internal problems that would negatively affect earnings
per share ("EPS"), but failed to disclose this negative material information. 9 Plaintiffs alleged that Apple South, in addition to concealing
problems, "affirmatively misrepresented the direction in which the
strategy was taking the company, telling analysts that the new
restaurants would positively impact profit margins" and that EPS would
grow by thirty percent in five years.4 ° Plaintiffs claimed that during
the class period, Apple South sold more than ten million shares of its
stock and $125 million in debt securities. They also alleged that several
high-ranking officers named as defendants personally sold more than
$19.6 million of their stock in Apple South. Plaintiffs asserted that
defendants' misrepresentations and omissions caused the climb of the
Apple South stock price from $15.25 per share on May 26, 1995, to
$28.25 per share by May 1996. On September 24, 1996, Apple South
announced that its acquisition of the restaurants in the Midwest had
negatively impacted its buminess, EPS for 1996 would not meet the
forecasted growth and would likely not exceed EPS for 1995, and it was

37. Section 20A of the Exchange Act provides, in part:
Any person who violates any provisions of this title or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material,
nonpublic information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of
securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased (where such violation
is based on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based on a
purchase of securities) securities of the same class.
15 U.S.C. § 78-t(1)(a).
38. 187 F.3d at 1274.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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After this
scaling back its expansion plans for 1996 and 1997.
announcement, the Apple South stock price fell by forty percent. 4'
The district court granted plaintiffs' motion to strike certain documents attached to defendants' motion to dismiss and ruled that the
standard for pleading scienter under the PSLRA was that a "strong
inference" of scienter could be raised by "'alleging facts that show the
defendants had a motive and opportunity to commit fraud'" or "'alleging
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness."'4 2 However, because the Eleventh Circuit
had not addressed the PSLRA, the district court recommended the court
of appeals permit an interlocutory appeal and consider the scope of
materials that a district court may consider in ruling on a motion to
dismiss and the standard for pleading scienter in a securities fraud
case.

43

The court first addressed the scope of materials to be considered in
ruling on a motion to dismiss." Defendants had attached documents
filed with the SEC that they contended contained cautionary language
to support defenses of the safe harbor protection for forward-looking
statements under the PSLRA and the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.4 5
The district court ruled that under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure certain exhibits attached to defendants' motion to
dismiss could not be considered because the documents embodied
matters outside the pleadings. 46 The Eleventh Circuit held that "the
district court was authorized at the motion to dismiss stage to take
judicial notice of relevant public documents required to be filed with the
SEC, and actually filed, for the purpose of determining what statements
the documents contain."47 The court considered the reasoning of the
Second Circuit on the issue: Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides that "'a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject
to reasonable dispute in that it is ... capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.'" 4' The court noted that the documents in question were

41. Id.
42. Bryant v. Apple South, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1379-81 (M.D. Ga. 1998).
43. Id. at 1383. The issues on appeal had not been considered by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals under the PSLRA. The district court had adopted the standard for
pleading scienter under the PSLRA formulated by the Second Circuit in Shields v. Citytrust
Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994). 187 F.3d at 1276-77.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1276-81.
46. Id. at 1276-77.
47. Id. See Bryant, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1376-77.
48. 187 F.3d at 1280.
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"'required by law to be filed with the SEC, and no serious question as to
their authenticity can exist.'"49 Further, "the documents are the very
documents that are alleged to contain the various misrepresentations or
omissions and are not relevant to prove the truth of their contents but
only to determine what the documents stated.""0 The court noted that
in the typical securities fraud case a party should not be caught by
surprise when SEC filings outside the pleadings are presented at an
early stage because the plaintiffs are normally well aware of a defendant's SEC filings. 5
The court next addressed the issue of what standard must be met in
52
order to plead scienter under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Exchange Act.
Although it is clear under the PSLRA that scienter cannot be averred
generally, the court posed two questions that had not been addressed in
the Eleventh Circuit: "[11 Are well-pled allegations of recklessness
sufficient to allege scienter... and... [2] are allegations of motive and
opportunity to commit fraud sufficient ...

[?]""

With respect to the

first question, the court noted that prior to the passage of the PSLRA,
every circuit to address the question held that a showing of recklessness
was sufficient to allege scienter.54 Thus, the "required state of mind"
for alleging scienter referenced in the PSLRA at the time of its passage
encompassed reckless behavior.55 Because Congress had the opportunity to change this standard when drafting the PSLRA but did not, the

49. Id. at 1277 n.9 (quoting Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir.
1991)).
50. Id. (quoting Kramer, 937 F.2d at 774).
51. Id. (quoting Kramer, 937 F.2d at 774).

52. Id. at 1279.
53. Id. at 1276-81.
54. Id. at 1282. The court noted that four other circuits had issued opinions
interpreting the PSLRA and addressing the scienter standard. Id. The Ninth Circuit had
held that "allegations showing motive and opportunity to commit fraud are not sufficient
to allege the necessary state of mind under the [PSLRA], and that conscious recklessness
is required to raise a strong inference of scienter." Id. at 1283 (citing In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 988 (9th Cir. 1999)). The Second and Third
Circuits had held that "a strong inference of scienter can be alleged by showing a motive
and opportunity to commit fraud or by showing circumstantial evidence denoting either
recklessness or conscious misbehavior." Id. (citing In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d
525, 534 (3rd Cir. 1999) and Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir.
1999)). The Sixth Circuit had held that "scienter could be alleged by pleading facts that
give rise to a strong inference of recklessness" but rejected "the proposition that allegations
of motive and opportunity to commit fraud were sufficient to plead scienter, unless the
facts demonstrate the required state of mind, namely that the defendant acted recklessly
or knowingly." Id. (citing In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir.
1999)).
55. Id. at 1284.
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court reasoned that it had not eliminated recklessness as a basis for
liability but had essentially codified "the well-established law that
recklessness was sufficient to allege scienter.",6 Thus, the court held
that "a complaint alleging with particularity that a defendant acted with
a severely reckless state of mind still suffices to state a claim for civil
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."57 The court further held
that allegations of motive and opportunity, without more, are not
sufficient to demonstrate the requisite scienter in a securities fraud case
in the Eleventh Circuit.58 The court reasoned that, although motive
and opportunity to commit fraud may contribute to an inference of
severe recklessness, they are not its equivalent. 59 Further, motive and
opportunity do not constitute a "state of mind" as required by the
PSLRA.6°
III.

"KNOWING POSSESSION" TEST ADOPTED FOR
SECTION 10(B) FRAUD CLAIMS

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder prohibit

insider trading, that is, buying or selling securities on the basis of
material nonpublic information." However, the circuits that have
considered the issue have been split on what, if any, causal connection
must be shown between a trader's possession of inside information and
his or her trading activities. One circuit has held that a trader may be
liable for trading while in "knowing possession" of material nonpublic
information.62 The Eleventh Circuit took the contrary view in 1998 and
held that the proper test for determining whether a violation of the
insider trading provisions has occurred is whether one in possession of
material inside information used the information in connection with the

trades that formed the basis for the alleged violations. 3 Effective
October 23, 2000, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-1 under the Exchange Act
to address whether insider trading liability requires the "knowing

possession" standard of material nonpublic information or proof that the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1283.
Id. 1285-86.
Id. at 1286.
See supra notes 5-6.

62. See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1993).
63. See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998). See also David M. Calhoun
& L. Briley Brisendine, Jr., Securities Regulation, 50 MERCER L. REV. 1081 (1999)
(discussing Adler). The Ninth Circuit has also held that the use of material nonpublic
information must be proven in a criminal case. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051,
1069 & n.27 (9th Cir. 1998).
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trader "used" the information and determined that the "knowing
possession" standard is more appropriate. 64 Rule 10b5-1(a) states:
The "manipulative and deceptive devices" prohibited by Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder include, among other
things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of
material nonpublic information about that security or issuer in breach
of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or
derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that
issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material
nonpublic information. 5
Rule 10b5-1(b) further states that "a purchase or sale of a security of an
issuer is 'on the basis of material nonpublic information about that
security or issuer if the person making the purchase or sale was aware
of the material nonpublic information when the person made the
purchase or sale."'66 Generally, under the new rule, a trade is made on
the basis of material nonpublic information if the trader was aware of
the information at the time of the purchase or sale. In its adopting
release, the SEC states that while the SEC staff believes the knowing
possession standard best accomplishes the goal of protecting investors
and the integrity of the securities markets, it recognizes that the
standard could be overbroad in some respects. 7 However, the SEC
staff stated that the new rule "attempts to balance these considerations
by means of a general rule based on 'awareness' of the material
nonpublic information, with several carefully enumerated affirmative
defenses."" Some commentators responded to the proposed rule with
concerns that the awareness standard for insider trading might
eliminate the scienter element from insider trading cases." However,
the preliminary note to Rule 10b5-1 provides that Rule 10b5-1 does not
modify the scope of insider trading law in any respect other than to
define when a purchase or sale constitutes trading "on the basis of'
material nonpublic information.70
Rule 10b5-1(c) provides an affirmative defense to alleged violations.
It provides that a person's purchase or sale is not "on the basis of'
material nonpublic information if the person demonstrates that before
becoming aware of the information the person had (i) entered into a

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (1998).
Id.
Id.
Id. §§ 230, 240, 243, 249.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 240.10b5-1.
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binding contract to purchase or sell the security, (ii) instructed another
person to purchase or sell the security for his or her account, or
(iii) adopted a written plan for trading securities.7v To meet the
requirements for the rule's defense, the contract, instruction, or plan
must either (i) specify (or provide a written formula or mechanism for
determining) the amount, price, and date of the transaction in question,
or (ii) not permit the trader to exercise any subsequent influence over
how, when, or whether to effect sales or purchases. If this sort of
influence is exercised, the person who exercises it must not be aware of
material nonpublic information when doing so. 7 2

Obviously, the

defense is only effective if the purchase or sale was made pursuant to
the contract, instruction, or plan required by the rule.73
As outlined above, the new rule not only establishes the standard for
the causal connection that is required to be shown between a trader's
possession of inside information and the related trading activity, but it
also provides an affirmative defense for properly structured transactions.
The rule may also decrease the number of lawsuits alleging fraudulent
acts committed in order to facilitate insiders' sales. Presumably, more
often than not, the standard for transactions by an issuer's insiders will
be transactions within the rule's affirmative defense.
IV. CONCLUSION

Although few in number, the cases decided during the survey period
established important precedent under the PSLRA in the Eleventh
Circuit. Undoubtedly, corporate insiders and their brokers and financial
advisors will develop pre-arranged selling programs under new Rule
10b5-1, and counsel to these companies and their insiders will be faced
with analyzing these programs for abuses and in light of existing insider
trading policies.

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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